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I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Lawrence Zelenak has put forth a detailed proposal'
for repealing present Section 1014 of the Internal Revenue Code,2
which gives a decedent's successor a basis equal to the estate tax
value of property at death.3 This rule, commonly known as the
stepped-up basis (at death) rule, has been roundly criticized as pro-
ducing an unwarranted (inequitable, nonneutral) income tax loophole,
because the step up in basis without realization of gain removes the
gain from the tax system entirely. Its repeal, therefore, offers a po-
tential source of significant revenue.4 Moreover, Section 1014 aggra-
vates the "lock-in effect"; that is, it inhibits rational deployment of
investment funds by inducing taxpayers to retain gain property until
death. Repeal of Section 1014 alone, however, does not solve the
problem, because it must then be decided whether the decedent's
basis should carry over to her successors, as presently occurs under
Section 1015 with respect to inter vivos gifts, or whether a gratuitous
transfer should be treated as a realization event, with the amount
1. Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Gains at Death, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 361, 395-440 (1993). See
generally Charles 0. Galvin, Taxing Gains at Death: A Further Comment, 46 Vand. L. Rev.
1525 (1993); Dan Subotnik, On Constructively Realizing Constructive Realization: Building the
Case for Death and Taxes, 38 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1 (1989). The Treasury Department proposed
taxing gains at death in 1969, but the proposal was not enacted. See Joint Pub. of House
Comm. on Ways and Means and Senate Finance Comm., Tax Reform Studies and Proposals
(Feb. 5, 1969). For an analysis of the proposals, see Jerome Kurtz and Stanley S. Surrey,
Reform of Death and Gift Taxes: The 1969 Treasury Proposals, The Criticisms, and a Rebuttal,
70 Colum. L. Rev. 1365, 1381 (1970).
2. Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references in this Article are to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and Treasury Regulation references are codified in 26
C.F.R. § __ (section number indicated in citation).
3. The estate tax value is the value on the estate tax valuation date, which, under an
election by the personal representative of the decedent's estate, is either the date of death or the
alternate valuation date (the earlier of the date that is six months after the decedent's death or
the date on which the estate or legatee sells or disposes of the asset). See I.R.C. § 2032. For the
vast majority of decedents, the estate tax valuation date is the date of death.
4. The revenue gain from taxing gains at death is estimated to be in the $9 billion per
year range. See Congressional Budget Office, Reducing the Deficit: Spending and Revenue
Options 321 (March 21, 1994), reprinted in BNA Daily Tax Report, Special Supplement of March
22, 1994, at S-37. Professor Zelenak's sources indicate a possible revenue gain in the $11 billion
to $30 billion range. Zelenak, 46 Vand. L. Rev. at 371 n.44 (cited in note 1).
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realized deemed to be the fair market value of the property at death.5
Professor Zelenak favors the deemed-realization approach. I concur
in this view, wholly apart from the fact that the carryover basis ap-
proach was tried and repealed.
6
This Article attempts to avoid unnecessary redundancy with
Professor Zelenak's article. Unlike Professor Zelenak, who concen-
trates on the practical reasons for favoring repeal of Section 1014 and
preferring the deemed-realization approach over the carryover basis
approach, I emphasize the theory and policy reasons justifying these
outcomes. In the section of this Article that addresses the technical
details of the proposal, I point out areas of disagreement with
Professor Zelenak, plus Professor Zelenak's areas of omission or light
coverage. Ultimately, my preferred version of the taxing gains at
death proposal would have fewer gaps than Professor Zelenak's
proposal but would be more generous to taxpayers in certain
instances.
II. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
At the theoretical level, the first issue is what is wrong with
Section 1014 and the second issue is whether it should be replaced by
a carryover basis rule or a deemed-realization rule.
A Arguments Against Repeal of Section 1014
There exist only three possible arguments against repeal of
Section 1014. One is that Section 1014 is necessary to preserve the
integrity of the exclusion for bequests and inheritances. The second is
that imposing both an income tax and a transfer tax upon a gratui-
tous transfer is excessive death taxation. The third is that
5. Of course, the amount realized in a gratuitous transfer is actually zero, producing a
(nondeductible) loss. If the amount deemed to be realized were the fair market value, the
accrued gain (or loss) would be attributed to the transferor. To prevent taxing the transferee on
the same gain, the transferee would obtain a basis equal to the deemed amount realized,
namely, the fair market value upon disposition or transfer. Numerous provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code operate in this fashion. See, for example, I.R.C. § 311(b) (applying to
nonliquidating distribution by corporation of appreciated property); I.R.C. § 336 (applying to
corporate liquidating distribution); I.R.C. § 453B(a)(2) (applying to disposition of installment
obligations); I.R.C. § 737 (applying to certain partnership distributions); I.R.C. § 1245 (applying
to certain dispositions of depreciable personal property); I.R.C. § 1250 (applying to certain
dispositions of depreciable real property); I.R.C. § 1254 (applying to certain dispositions of
natural resource properties).
6. Congress enacted a carryover basis rule for death-time transfers in 1976, but retroac-
tively repealed it in 1980. See Zelenak, 46 Vand. L. Rev. at 365 (cited in note 1).
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"realization" is a necessary predicate for the existence of income, and
that death is not a realization event.
1. Preserving the Integrity of the Exclusion for
Bequests and Inheritances
Section 102 excludes from income any gifts, bequests, inheri-
tances, and, by implication, other gratuitous transfers received. If a
recipient of an in-kind gratuitous transfer did not receive a fair mar-
ket value-at-transfer basis, the exclusion would be only temporary
and illusory, in whole or in part, whereas that for a recipient of cash
would be permanent.7
The value-at-transfer basis rule was abandoned very early on
in the case of inter vivos gifts and replaced by a carryover basis rule,
the present version of which is Section 1015.8 If the value-at-transfer
basis rule applied to gifts, the transfer of gifts of appreciating assets
within families would eliminate gains from the tax system.9 Thus, the
principle in this case of preserving the Section 102 exclusion with
respect to in-kind gifts can rightly yield to expediency when the fun-
damental integrity of the tax system as a whole is at stake.10 In the
practical sense, the Section 1014 basis rule does not threaten the total
elimination of gain from the system, since death is a unique event for
each individual and would not be undertaken solely to save income
taxes.
On the theoretical level, the "integrity of the exclusion" ration-
ale for Section 1014 is only as strong as the underlying rationale for
the Section 102 exclusion itself. A compelling case can be made for
the repeal of Section 102 and the inclusion of gratuitous receipts in
income., Because repeal of Section 102 is not immediately likely, it
will suffice here to look at the possible rationales for Section 102.
7. See Joseph M. Dodge, The Logic of Tax 37-39 (West, 1989).
8. In Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S. 470, 482 (1929), the Supreme Court upheld the carryover
basis rule against the argument that taxing the transferees on income that accrued to the donor
violated the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
9. See Rice v. Eisner, 16 F.2d 358, 360 (2d Cir. 1926).
10. Other examples occur with the numerous rules designed to prevent avoidance of
income tax on wages provided in the form of goods and services in-kind. See, for example, I.R.C.
§ 61(a)(1) (stating that fringe benefits are included in gross income unless specifically excluded
by the Code); I.R.C. § 83(a) (applying to receipt of property by service provider); I.R.C. §
7872(c)(1)(B) (applying to below-market compensation-related loans); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(a), (d)
(regarding compensation in general).
11. See generally Joseph M. Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including Gifts
and Bequests in Income, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1177 (1978); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The
Constitutional Meaning of Income and the Income Taxation of Gifts, 25 Conn. L. Rev. 1 (1992).
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There are two possible historical rationales that can be dis-
pensed with in short order. The first is that gratuitous transfers
received are a taxpayer's original endowment and, therefore, are
"capital" rather than "income."12 This means of distinguishing princi-
pal from income derives from the law of trust accounting, the basic
principle of which is to protect the respective interests of income
takers and remainders of trusts. 13 However, there is no reason why
income taxation should follow trust accounting principles. 4 The mod-
ern concept of income refers to accessions to wealth, 15 a category into
which the receipt of gratuitous transfers clearly falls.
16
A second possible historical rationale is that the Section 102
exclusion was enacted in contemplation of the later enactment of an
estate tax.17 Prior to World War II, the income tax had such large
exemptions (and low rates) that it impacted only a small portion of
the population. 8 Today, the estate and gift taxes have such large
deductions, exclusions, and credits that they impinge on less than ten
percent of the population, 9 whereas the income tax is nearly univer-
Accord Henry Simons, Personal Income Taxation 125-47 (U. of Chicago, 1938); Galvin, 46 Vand.
L. Rev. at 1529 (cited in note 1).
12. See Maijorie E. Kornhauser, The Origins of Capital Gains Taxation: What's Law Got
To Do With It?, 39 Sw. L. J. 869, 885-93 (1985).
13. See Restatement (Second) of the Law of Trusts, §§ 176, 181, 183, 232 (1959). For trust
accounting purposes, gains and losses are treated as increases and decreases in corpus, which
ultimately pass to the remainders, not income. See Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act
§ 2(a), 3(b)(1), 7B U.L.. 145 (1985).
14. The Supreme Court explicitly rejected the trust accounting view of income in
Merchants'Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 521-22 (1921).
15. See Simons, Personal Income Taxation at 43-56 (cited in note 11) (stating, after
dismissing other concepts of income, that income for income tax purposes should be net changes
in wealth plus consumption for the taxable period). This work is undoubtedly the single most
influential one in United States income tax theory. See Glenshaw Glass Co. v. Commissioner,
348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (stating that "income" under I.R.C. § 22(a), where specific Code
provisions are silent, means clearly realized accessions to wealth). See also I.R.C. § 74(a)
(stating that prizes are included in income); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14 (including treasure trove,
illegal gains, and damage awards not excluded under I.R.C. § 104 in gross income).
16. See Simons, Personal Income Taxation at 56-58.
17. See William A. Klein, An Enigma in the Federal Income Tax The Meaning of the
Word "Gift," 48 Minn. L. Rev. 215, 234-35 (1963).
18. See Stanley S. Surrey, et al., Federal Income Taxation Cases And Materials 6
(Foundation, 1986) (stating that less than 5% of the public paid income taxes).
19. In 1990, only 59,000 estate tax returns were filed. See Internal Revenue Service, U.S.
Dep't of Treasury, Pub. 55, Annual Report 1990 19 (1991) ("I.R.S. Annual Report 1990"). In
1990, there were 2,148,500 deaths. See Economics and Statistics Administration, U.S. Dept. of
Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 91 (1993). These statistics indicate that
only 2.6% of the estates filed tax returns. Due to the marital and charitable deductions, it is
safe to assume that estate tax actually was paid in substantially less than the total number of
estates for which estate tax returns were filed.
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sal.20 Thus, it is unrealistic to view the Section 102 exclusion as being
'made up for" by the estate and gift taxes. 21 Moreover, the two taxes
are wholly separate in concept, since the estate and gift taxes are
"second" taxes on amounts previously subject to the income tax.
Finally, the revenue yield from the estate and gift taxes is paltry
compared to that of the income tax.22
It is sometimes argued that the concept of income is connected
with net national product; hence, gratuitous transfers should not be
considered income because they do not involve the creation of wealth,
but only its transfer.23 The rationale for favoring this concept of in-
come-which Henry Simons soundly rejected 2 --is that taxes on net
income (meaning creation of net wealth) will not unduly inhibit
economic activity, because the tax will always be less than the in-
crease in social product.25 This rationale, however, has no application
whatsoever to taxes imposed by reason of death, an inevitable event
uninhibited by taxation. Although taxes on inter vivos gifts-which
are far lower in amount than death-time transfers-might reduce
their making, there is no reason to suppose that the making of fewer
gifts would hurt the economy in any way, unless one were to assume
that donees would make more rational economic choices than do-
nors.26 Also, significant inter vivos gifts would be relatively uncom-
mon even without any tax on them.27 Finally, enactment of the
20. In 1990, 112.5 million individual income tax returns were filed, a hefty portion of
which were undoubtedly joint returns covering two married individuals. See I.R.S. Annual
Report 1990 at 19.
21. Repeal of Section 102 might raise upwards of $100 billion per year. See Galvin, 46
Vand. L. Rev. at 1526 n.6 (cited in note 1).
22. In 1990, the individual income taxes accounted for 51.1% of federal revenues, whereas
the estate and gift taxes accounted for only 1.1% of federal revenues. See I.R.S. Annual Report
1990 at 19 (cited in note 19).
23. See Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 Yale
L. J. 1081, 1088 (1980).
24. See Simons, Personal Income Taxation at 44-49, 58 (cited in note 11). See also Victor
Thuronyi, The Concept of Income, 46 Tax L. Rev. 45, 74 (1990).
25. See Norman H. Lane, A Theory of the Tax Base: The Exchange Model, 3 Am. J. Tax
Policy 1, 19-34 (1984).
26. Donees, being generally less well-off than donors, would be more likely than the
donors to consume rather than invest the subject matter of the gift.
27. See Carl S. Shoup, Federal Estate and Gift Taxes 17-25 (Brookings Institute, 1966).
During the 1989-90 period, estate tax revenue collections totaled about $17.8 billion, whereas
gift tax collections totaled about $3 billion. See I.R.S. Annual Report 1990 at 19 (cited in note
19). Estate tax returns in 1990 reported aggregate taxable estates of $48.6 billion and
aggregate adjusted taxable gifts (post-1976 taxable gifts not included in the gross estate) of only
$1.2 billion. See Internal Revenue Service, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Vol. 11, No. 3, Statistics of
Income Bulletin 69 (Winter 1991-92). Present transfer tax law provides at least two incentives
to the making of lifetime gifts: (1) the $10,000 per donee per year exclusion of I.R.C. Section
2503(b) applies only for gift tax purposes; and (2) the transfer tax base excludes gift taxes
(except for gifts made within three years of death, see I.R.C. § 2035(c)) but includes estate taxes.
1832 [Vol. 47:1827
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deemed-realization proposal would not inhibit gifts when the taxpayer
had cash or high basis assets to give.
Another theory for the Section 102 exclusion is that gifts rep-
resent the "shared" wealth of two taxpayers. 28 This argument is sim-
ply counterfactual with respect to money and property, since wealth is
shifted, not shared. The sharing idea makes no sense at all with
respect to bequests and inheritances. The argument that the gift
exclusion treats the donor and donee as being in the same taxable
unit29 is not only counterfactual but also question begging.30
These last two arguments are ultimately reducible to the
proposition that Congress simply does not want to tax both the trans-
feror and the transferee with respect to the same item under the
income tax. It could accomplish this result either by taxing the re-
cipient and allowing the transferor a deduction or, as under present
law, by disallowing any deduction to the transferor but excluding the
receipt from income.31 The former alternative would undermine the
progressive rate structure by allowing gifts to shift income out of the
high tax brackets of donors into the low brackets of donees. It also
risks donors making sham gifts, donees underreporting accessions,
and donors overreporting deductible transfers. Finally, it is some-
what absurd to give a decedent an income tax deduction for the entire
amount of transferred wealth; how could such a large deduction be
used effectively? Given the (perhaps misguided) premise of no double
taxation, the Section 102 solution is self-evident.
28. See Richard Goode, The Individual Income Tax 99 (Brookings, 1976). Goode's 'pooling
of consumption" argument has more relevance to the concept of in-kind "support." See text
accompanying notes 121-23.
29. The basic taxable unit is the individual. See I.R.C. § 1(b)-(d). Married couples filing
jointly are treated as two individuals whose aggregate net income is split evenly between them.
Compare I.R.C. § 1(a) with I.R.C. § 1(d). Investment income of children under the age of 14 is
effectively attributed to their parents for rate purposes, but not for filing purposes. See I.R.C. §
1(g) (regarding the "kiddie tax").
30. Considering the donor and donee part of the same taxable unit is merely a fancy way
of describing the effect of Section 102; it does not explain why this result should occur in the
context of a tax system in which the basic taxable unit is the individual. See Kornhauser, 25
Conn. L. Rev. at 36-37 (cited in note 11).
31. As a matter of positive law, Section 262 disallows the deduction as a "personal... or
family expense." I.R.C. § 262(a). On the theoretical level, a leading norm is that of "Haig
Simons income," net changes in wealth plus consumption over the taxable period. See Simons,
Personal Income Taxation at 50-51 (cited in note 11). In the abstract, it is just as plausible to
treat gratuitous transfers as losses rather than as "consumption." For further discussion on the
deductibility of gifts, see Kornhauser, 25 Conn. L. Rev. at 29-35. Although it has never been
suggested that bequests be deductible, so long as gratuitous transfers are excludable under
Section 102, the deductibility issue is moot. It is necessary to disallow the deduction solely by
reason of the exclusion; otherwise, the tax base, especially with respect to the well-off, would be
in serious jeopardy.
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Thus, the only rational basis of Section 102 is to avoid double
taxation of the same item to two taxpayers. This rationale clearly
does not support the "integrity of the exclusion" argument for Section
1014, because the latter goes beyond avoiding double taxation to
eliminating gain from the system entirely. In fact, the Section 102
approach to the double taxation issue, which is to tax the donor rather
than the donee, supports the deemed-realization solution.
2. Would Deemed Realization Produce Excessive Taxation?
Under a deemed-realization system, it is conceivable that a
zero basis asset would be subject to the highest income tax rate (39.6
percent), the highest gift or estate tax rate (fifty-five percent), and the
highest generation-skipping tax rate (fifty-five percent). This looks
like horrendous confiscatory taxation-and then some. However,
because the income tax owed would be deductible from the estate or
gift tax base, and the estate or gift tax would be subtracted from the
generation-skipping tax base, the rates would not be cumulative.
Thus, the maximum aggregate tax rate would be 87.75 percent,
whereas without the deemed-realization tax the aggregate tax rate
would still be 79.75 percent. Thus, in the worst case scenario-which
makes the implausible assumption of a zero basis asset32--the
deemed-realization tax would impose an incremental tax bite of only
about twelve percent.33
Under present law, taxpayers who realize gains before death
can end up paying all three taxes. Thus, Section 1014 enables some
taxpayers to avoid a tax to which other taxpayers are subject. In
order to put all taxpayers on the same footing, the alternatives are:
(1) a deemed-realization rule; or (2) exemption of all gains, whenever
realized, from income taxation, a solution that even the most die-hard
advocates of Section 1014 have refrained from advancing. Even under
a deemed-realization rule, taxpayers who avoided realizing gains
during life would be better off economically than those who did and
paid income taxes earlier.
It is misleading to consider all three taxes together, because
the implication is that adoption of a deemed-realization rule would
produce some monster death tax of arbitrary and capricious applica-
32. The most common zero basis assets, qualified pension plans and Individual
Retirement Accounts ("IRAs', would be subject to a carryover basis rule. See text
accompanying notes 86-91.
33. The increased tax burden could be higher if state piggy-back income taxes are taken
into account, but states could deviate from federal law in this instance.
1834 [Vol. 47:1827
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tion. The taxes, however, are separate; it is only by coincidence that
all three would be imposed by reason of the same event. As noted
immediately above, the income tax could just as easily be imposed
earlier upon the actual realization of the gains by the decedent prior
to death. Indeed, with enactment of a deemed-realization system, it
would be expected that inter vivos realizations would occur much
more frequently than under current law. The generation-skipping tax
is imposed by reason of the transferor's death only if it is a "direct
skip" type of generation-skipping transfer; this tax can be delayed by
making the transfer in another form, and it can be avoided altogether
by omitting the generation skipping feature. Moreover, direct-skip
generation-skipping transfers are taxed at a lower rate than other
generation-skipping transfers, because the generation-skipping tax
base does not include the generation-skipping tax.3 4 Finally, the es-
tate and gift taxes are imposed only when cumulative taxable trans-
fers of a person exceed six hundred thousand dollars,s5 and the gen-
eration-skipping tax is imposed only where cumulative generation-
skipping transfers of a person exceed one million dollars.
36
Last, if enactment of a deemed-realization rule results in ex-
cessive taxation, the logical solution is modification or even repeal of
the federal transfer taxes.37
3. Death is Not a Realization Event
It is argued that there can be no income without realization,
and that death is not a realization event, nor should it be treated as a
realization event, because it is involuntary38 However, all three
components of this argument beg the question.
Although "realization" once was thought to be a constitutional
prerequisite for the definition of income,39 that is no longer the case.
The Supreme Court has said that the realization principle is "founded
34. See I.R.C. § 2623.
35. See I.R.C. §§ 2010, 2505 (pertaining to unified transfer tax credit). Taxable transfers
are those in excess of exemptions, exclusions, offsets, and deductions, including the unlimited
marital and charitable deductions.
36. I.R.C. § 2631(a).
37. See Galvin, 46 Vand. L. Rev. at 1526-28 (cited in note 1). See generally Joel C. Dobris,
A Brief for the Abolition of All Transfer Taxes, 35 Syracuse L. Rev. 1215 (1984). Canada
repealed its federal transfer taxes upon enactment of a deemed-realization-at-death system.
See Richard M. Bird, Canada's Vanishing Death Taxes, 16 Osgoode Hall L. J. 133, 137 (1978).
38. See Byrle M. Abbin, Taxing Appreciation Hits Everything Up Front: Retirement
Benefits, Deferred Compensation, And.. ., 58 Tax Notes 1659, 1660 (March 22, 1993).
39. See generally Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207-08 (1920).
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on administrative convenience."40 Therefore, Congress can abolish or
modify it in particular instances if it so desires, and Congress has in
fact done so in numerous instances.41 Indeed, the Supreme Court has
held that the gift of property subject to a liability is a realization
event,42 and it is generally settled that any disposition of mortgaged
property, where another party takes over the liability, is a realization
event.4 3
"Administrative convenience" refers to possible difficulties in
valuation and in raising liquid cash to pay the tax liability with re-
spect to the included, if unrealized, income. Actually, difficulty of
valuation usually stems from the fact of nonliquidity; a liquid invest-
ment would have a value no less than the net amount obtainable upon
liquidation.44 A deemed-realization-at-death rule would raise these
issues about once a generation, as opposed to annually, if the realiza-
tion requirement were abolished across the board. In any event, the
possible existence of nonliquidity and difficulty in valuation depends
on the type of asset involved. The fact that some kinds of assets raise
these problems does not support the proposition that death (or gift)
can never be a realization event.4 5
Perhaps the leading norm of tax policy is the Haig-Simons
definition of income, "net increases in wealth plus consumption over
the taxable period, 46 which in its pure form abjures any realization
doctrine.4 7 The Haig-Simons concept of income, in turn, rests on the
40. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116 (1940). Accord Commissioner V.
Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 493 U.S. 203, 209 (1990).
41. See, for example, I.R.C. § 305(b) (including non-pro rata stock dividends in income);
I.R.C. § 475A(2)(a) (taxing unrealized gains and losses of dealers in securities); I.R.C. § 551
(taxing undistributed foreign personal holding company income to United States shareholders);
I.R.C. § 671 (taxing income of certain trusts to grantor even when not received); I.R.C. §
702(a)(1)-(3) (taxing partner on share of partnership's profits and losses); I.R.C. § 951 (including
undistributed profits of certain foreign corporations in income of United States shareholders);
I.R.C. § 1256 (marking certain contracts to market); I.R.C. § 1272 (including original issue
discount); I.R.C. § 1366 (regarding pass-thru of profits and losses to shareholders of S corpora-
tions). The Ninth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of Section 1256 in Murphy v. United
States, 992 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1993). See also Rev. Rul. 91-31, 1991-1 Cum. Bull. 19, 20 (treating
reduction of debt secured by property as cancellation of debt income even where property is not
transferred).
42. Diedrich v. Commissioner, 457 U.S. 191, 199-200 (1982).
43. See, for example, Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079, 1084 (6th Cir. 1974)
(holding that a gift of property is subject to mortgage).
44. Actual liquidation might necessitate incurring significant transaction costs, such as
appraisers' and brokers' fees. Such built-in costs would reduce value.
45. For a discussion of particular categories of assets that raise valuation and liquidity
problems, see text accompanying notes 135-40.
46. See Simons, Personal Income Taxation at 50 (cited in note 11).
47. Id. at 153 (acknowledging, however, that administrative concerns in certain circum-
stances dictate the realization principle).
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norms of ability to pay and economic neutrality. Ability to pay is a
maxim of ethics or justice that holds that persons should contribute to
government according to their material means. Ability to pay is not
synonymous with cash in hand, but presumptively includes all the
taxpayer's economic resources. One can debate the extent to which
ability to pay allows for nonliquidity, and indeed that is precisely
what will be undertaken herein.
Economic neutrality posits that the tax system should not
favor some investments over others. Under the income tax, invest-
ments are made generally with after-tax dollars.48 Unrealized appre-
ciation that escapes income tax, however, deviates from this norm;
functionally, it is a nontaxed additional investment in the same prop-
erty. The realization principle distorts economic choices by favoring
appreciating assets over assets that produce current income, such as
interest, dividends, rents, and royalties. Section 1014 goes even be-
yond the realization principle by wholly excluding unrealized gains
held until death. Taxing unrealized gains at death would move the
income tax closer to the Haig-Simons concept of income and its under-
lying norms. But even under the neutrality norm, some concessions
can be made with respect to nonliquid assets, because such assets,
once acquired, are inherently locked in by the difficulties and (nontax)
costs associated with disposing of them.49
The argument that death does not generate any "amount real-
ized" to the decedent proves too much, because it suggests that the
decedent should obtain a loss deduction on account of the disposition
of property. Although it might be said that the loss would be disal-
lowed because it is "personal,"5 that concept relates to the taxpayer's
holding purpose or use prior to disposition. It makes more sense to
ground the disallowance of the loss on: (1) the fact that the taxpayer
controlled the entire wealth during the taxable period; and (2) the fact
that allowing the loss would greatly erode the tax base with respect to
the wealthy, especially if such losses were carried back to prior tax-
able years. In any event, in the death situation, it is erroneous to say
that there is any loss while the taxpayer was in existence. Any loss
48. An investment is made with previously taxed dollars, and the investment itself is
nondeductible under the capitalization principle. See I.R.C. § 263(a). See generally Calvin H.
Johnson, Soft Money Investing Under the Income Tax, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1019 (1990).
49. Nonmarketable assets obtain a valuation discount for estate and gift tax purposes.
See, for example, Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 Cum. Bull. 237 (discussing effect of restrictions on sale
of assets). Such a discount might be concession enough under a deemed-realization-at-death
rule.
50. See I.R.C. § 165(c).
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pertains to the decedent's own human capital,61 not the property it-
self, which continues in existence after death.
That death normally is considered to be involuntary is irrele-
vant. There is no general tax principle that involuntariness yields an
exemption or other tax benefit beyond those that Congress chooses to
confer.52 Tax benefits contingent on involuntariness take the form of
allowances for additional unforeseen expenditures 53 or deferral of tax
on account of premature realizations. 54 An exemption for all unreal-
ized gains bears no relation to any incremental costs incurred by the
decedent or her successors; such costs, in fact, are treated separately
under the tax system.55 Similarly, the accelerated realization theory
only justifies deferral, not exemption. But, unlike the situation with
involuntary conversions of property,58 taxing gains at death should not
be viewed as any kind of undue acceleration of tax, because for the
decedent there is no tomorrow; it is either then or never. Of course,
the tax system could waive taxation of gains at death in favor of a
carryover basis rule, but that raises the next issue, namely, whether
the gains should be taxed to the decedent or the decedent's successor.
B. Why a Deemed-Realization Rule?
Once the repeal of Section 1014 is decided upon, it is then
necessary to decide whether the carryover basis rule of Section 1015
should be extended to death-time transfers or whether both gift and
death should trigger a deemed-realization rule. Tax policies support
51. The tax system generally ignores losses of human capital. See Joseph M. Dodge,
Taxing Human Capital Acquisition Costs--Or Why Costs of Higher Education Should Not Be
Deducted or Amortized, 54 Ohio St. L. J. 927, 959-63 (1993).
52. See Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504, 510-11 (1941) (holding that restrictions on
capital losses apply even where losses result from a forced sale). See also I.R.C. § 61(a)(1)
(including employee fringe benefits in gross income unless specifically excluded by Code provi-
sions).
53. See I.R.C. § 123 (providing for exclusion of insurance recoveries attributable to incre-
mental living expenses resulting from casualty to personal residence); I.R.C. § 165(c)(3), (h)
(imposing limitation on casualty loss deduction); I.R.C. § 213 (giving deduction for extraordinary
medical expenses).
54. See I.R.C. § 104 (providing exclusion for personal injury recoveries, which are mostly
an acceleration of income from human capital); I.R.C. § 1033 (deferring, under certain circum-
stances, gains on involuntary conversions); I.R.C. § 1231 (treating casualty gains as capital
gains). The casualty loss deduction, I.R.C. § 165(c)(3), (h), might also be rationalized on the
ground that anticipated future consumption is aborted on account of an unforeseen involuntary
loss or disposition.
55. Funeral expenses paid by the estate are deductible for estate tax purposes. See I.R.C.
§ 2053(a)(1). Estate administration expenses are allowed for either income tax purposes, I.R.O.
§ 212(1)-(2), or estate tax purposes, I.R.C. § 2053(a)(2), but not both. See I.R.C. § 642(g).
56. See I.R.C. § 1033(a) (requiring the taxpayer to reinvest in "similar use" property
within prescribed period of time).
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the latter alternative. Those policies include: (1) the internal logic of
an income tax; (2) economics; (3) ethics (fairness); and (4) distributive
justice.
The internal logic of an income tax posits that the same dollars
should be neither taxed to, nor deducted by, a given taxpayer more
than once. Neither approach would violate this norm. A deemed-
realization rule would not produce double taxation of the transferor
any more than in the common situation where a taxpayer sells gain
property and spends the proceeds on personal consumption. The
question is whether the gain or loss should be attributed to the trans-
feror or to the transferee. Aside from Section 1015, carryover basis
rules apply when entities and owners engage in tax-free exchanges
and transfers.57 In these cases, the owners and entities are alter egos.
Here, a carryover basis rule prevents gain from disappearing as it
moves from one pocket to the other. Essentially the same rationale
justifies Section 1015's carryover basis rule for inter vivos gifts. 58
These rationales do not apply to the death situation, because the
decedent's successor no longer can collaborate with the decedent to
reduce taxes on the former. Moreover, the better way to curb tax
avoidance, especially with respect to gifts,59 is to treat the gift as a
realization event.60
As to whether the pretransfer gain or loss should be attributed
to the transferor to whom it accrued or the transferee, the general
thrust of the income tax in general (as opposed to a consumption tax)
is to tax transferors, because they controlled the gain or loss and the
gain or loss is measured with reference to the investment of the trans-
ferors. 1 The argument that the transferee is the one who enjoys the
gain proves too much: it is an argument for taxing the donee on the
full amount or value of the receipt. Moreover, a carryover basis rule
would allow the shifting of losses to donees. 2 But it is nonsense to
57. See I.R.C. §§ 334(b), 362, 723, 732(a).
58. See text accompanying notes 126-29.
59. Under I.R.C. § 1015, by making an inter vivos gift, a high bracket donor can shift a
gain to a low bracket donee.
60. Tax-free exchanges and transfers are tolerated in entity owner transactions so as not
to inhibit the formation and liquidation of business entities. No such rationale applies to gratui-
tous transfers.
61. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and
the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 Hastings L. J. 63, 97-98 (1993) (noting basic income attribution
principles, assignment of income doctrine, and grantor trust rules).
62. Section 1015 does not allow the shifting of losses for inter vivos gifts, because the
donee's basis is the lower of the donor's basis or the value at the time of gift. This rule is de-
signed to prevent a low bracket donor from shifting a loss to a high bracket donee. It is unlikely
that a similar rule would be enacted for death-time transfers, since transfers of losses at death
would not be tax motivated.
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treat the donee as incurring any loss on the transaction as a whole,
because the donee is always better off as the result of the receipt.
By "economics," I mean neoclassical economics and the concept
of economic efficiency, which is usually expressed by the term
"neutrality." According to optimal taxation theory, death is the ideal
time to impose a disproportionately heavy tax, since the tax would
affect economic choices only minimally.63 Yet, the most neutral in-
come tax with respect to investments would be one that abolished the
realization principle entirely and with it the preference for capital
gains.64 Thus, as a general proposition, unrealized appreciation and
depreciation, at least of liquid assets and perhaps of all assets, should
be incorporated into the tax base annually.65 The deemed-realization
rule lies far closer to that norm than a carryover basis rule, which
would allow indefinite deferral of gain. A deemed-realization rule
also would be much more potent in combating the lock-in effect.
Finally, adoption of a deemed-realization rule would have the
salutary effect of increasing revenue that can be balanced by lower
rates in general and/or the elimination of preferences for capital
gains.
By "ethics," I am referring to tax fairness among individual
taxpayers, commonly expressed by the (inadequate) expression
"horizontal equity." The basic idea is that individual taxpayers
should contribute to a government that performs redistributive and
public good functions according to their respective abilities to pay. In
general, "ability to pay" refers to economic resources under the tax-
payer's control, whether in cash or in kind.66 In the present context,
63. For the argument that death taxes are undesirable because they are taxes on "capital"
(savings and investment), see C. Lowell Harriss, Estate Tax Revision and Capital Needs in the
1970"s, in Gersham Goldstein, Readings in Death and Gift Tax Reform 51 (Foundation, 1971), is
naive. The measure of the tax base does not dictate whether the amount used to pay the tax
reduces consumption as opposed to investment. Moreover, although death itself destroys
human capital, death taxes do not destroy assets-they only affect who owns them-nor does
the government appropriate assets in-kind. Another argument is that future death taxes reduce
the incentive to save. See Michael Boskin, An Economist's Perspective on Estate Taxation, in
Edward C, Halbach, ed., Death, Taxes, and Family Property: Essays and American Assembly
Report 56, 62-64 (West, 1977). However, insofar as savings are target- or bequest-oriented, it is
more logical to presume that the prospect of future death taxes would induce a person to save
more to achieve the desired after tax result.
64. See text accompanying notes 48-49.
65. See David J. Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation,
134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1111, 1113-18 (1986) (proposing accrual taxation system as a more efficient
alternative to the current income tax system).
66. Ronald D. Aucutt, in arguing against any change in present income tax law, equates
"ability to pay" with actual voluntary realizations. See Ronald D. Aucutt, Further Observations
on Transfer Tax Restructuring: A Practitioner's Perspective, 42 Tax Law. 343, 347 (1989). But
one can have realization without liquidity (for example, an exchange of publicly traded stock for
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unrealized appreciation generally constitutes ability to pay; whether
nonliquid assets should fall in this category is an issue to be consid-
ered below. Aside from the possibility of a concession to nonliquidity,
the ability to pay dictates that the transferor be subject to tax on net
unrealized appreciation, preferably as it accrues. A deemed-
realization rule would conform to ability to pay more readily than a
carryover basis rule, although even the deemed-realization rule falls
short of the ideal.
By "distributive justice," I refer to the effect of tax rules on the
distribution of income or wealth among various classes in society.
Under the name "welfare economics," a branch of applied utilitarian-
ism, distributive justice is given a quasi-scientific aura and
(misleadingly) linked to classical economics. It is also allied with
ethics, because an ability to pay tax base combined with a progressive
rate structure ("vertical equity") should automatically produce dis-
tributive justice. Thus, distributive justice is rarely given independ-
ent weight in tax policy discussions, except in the context of rates, tax
rules with respect to transactions associated with certain economic
classes, or situations where it is hard to tell whether tax base rules
accurately reflect ability to pay. In any event, a deemed-realization
rule for inter vivos gifts clearly will have a more progressive effect
than a carryover basis rule, because it is safe to assume that donors
are generally wealthier than donees.
In the case of death-time transfers, the actual tax cannot be
borne by the transferor, who is now dead, but can be borne only by
transferees. There is no guarantee that the transferees are otherwise
well-off. Thus, the distributive justice preference for a deemed-
realization rule over a carryover basis rule here is somewhat indirect:
one can assume that wealthy transferors tend to have well-off
successors (after accessions), and that taxes on transferors generally
reduce inherited wealth, which is somehow less worthy or useful than
earned wealth and more in the nature of a windfall.
It might be said that the same point applies with equal respect
to the ability-to-pay norm. However, in that case the tax is viewed as
being imposed properly on the party who controlled the unrealized
appreciation. In the context of distributive justice, what counts is the
economic effect of the tax on various income groups. But this point
(again) is an argument for including the full amount of gratuitous
nonpublicly held restricted stock) and liquidity without realization (any asset for which a ready
market exists). Nor does the voluntariness of realizations have anything to do with whether the
gains should be taxed, because the tax system itself (the realization rule) induces people to
choose not to realize gains.
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transfers in the income tax base of transferees, an argument that is
out of bounds in the context of the present discussion.
A carryover basis rule is wholly inadequate under ability-to-
pay and progressivity norms (not to mention horizontal equity)
because it results in differential taxation among various transferees
receiving identical amounts according to the fortuitous circumstance
of differing bases attached to the various properties. This disparate
basis problem is avoidable in theory by figuring out the aggregate
basis of all properties transferred and then allocating the aggregate
basis pro rata among the various transferees. This solution involves
design and computational difficulties,6 7 however, and it simply cannot
be applied to inter vivos transfers. 68 More fundamentally, any basis
assigned to any successor misstates the successor's investment in the
property. Finally, the allocation of basis only operates among a given
decedent's transferees; it does not eliminate basis disparities among
all recipients of death-time transfers.
As a kind of footnote to this discussion, the well-known Davis
case69 is worth a brief discussion. There, a husband transferring ap-
preciated property in connection with a divorce was taxed on the
unrealized appreciation; the Internal Revenue Service conceded that
the wife took the property tax free with a nonstatutory stepped-up
basis.70 This case is often thought of as a "deemed-realization" case.
Unfortunately for this line of analysis, the husband probably had a
zero amount realized. Although the wife surrendered inchoate sup-
port and inheritance rights in connection with the settlement, the
surrender or cessation of such rights is not income or amount realized
under the income tax.71 The cancellation of debt theory does not apply
here, because the husband received no asset or other economic benefit
67. Unless all bases and all asset values are known, an allocation cannot work. If some
assets are subject to a carryover basis rule, see text accompanying notes 124-25, then such
assets must be identifiable readily and rules must be designed to prevent tax avoidance by
selecting the lowest basis assets to fund the carryover basis bequests and inheritances.
68. The bases and values of all transferred assets cannot be known until the donor's
death.
69. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
70. See Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 Cum. Bull. 63 (holding that transfer to wife of husband's
interest in apartment building in discharge of wife's dower rights resulted in no gain or loss to
wife, and basis of property was fair market value at time of transfer).
71. A wife's surrender of support, but not inheritance, rights constitutes "consideration in
money or money's worth" for gift tax purposes. See, for example, Estate of Glen v.
Commissioner, 45 T.C. 323 (1966). The reason for this result is that the support itself would not
have been a gift by the husband, whereas the inheritance would have been included in the
husband's gross estate. These doctrines have no relevance for income tax purposes.
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in advance of the settlement. 72 Generally, income does not arise sim-
ply by reason of avoiding future expenses, even if the future expenses
are imposed by law and are determinable in amount. The wife's
exclusion in this case is not based directly on Section 102, but
probably on the theory that the property received was a substitute for
future tax-free support (or inheritance).73 Once the settlement is
excluded, then the "integrity of the exclusion" principle might justify
giving the wife a stepped-up basis, notwithstanding the absence of
any applicable provision of the Code or regulations. But that
proposition too is doubtful, for exactly the same reasons as stated
above in connection with the discussion of Sections 102 and 1014. In
any event, the Supreme Court in Davis, faced with these government
concessions, was left to decide whether the husband was taxed on the
unrealized gain or whether nobody was taxed on it.74 By taxing the
husband, the Court possibly compounded error upon error.75 More
charitably, Davis can be viewed essentially as an income attribution
case. In the divorce situation, given the fact that the wife would not
be taxed on the entire value of the property received (another
debatable point in the abstract),7 the Court decided that it was better
72. See Commissioner v. Rail Joint Co., 61 F.2d 751, 752 (2d Cir. 1932) (holding that no
taxable gain resulted where corporation repurchased, below face value, bonds previously
distributed as dividends). A father subject to an obligation to pay monthly amounts of child
support does not have cancellation of debt income when the obligation is cancelled prematurely
by the child's death, marriage, or emancipation.
73. Rev. Rul. 67-221 (cited in note 70) does not articulate its rationale. Nevertheless,
there is an income tax doctrine that holds that the tax treatment of (damage) recoveries de-
ponds on what the recovery compensates. See, for example, Raytheon Prod. Co. v.
Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110, 113-14 (1st Cir. 1944) (holding that damages recovery in question
was for lost goodwill, not future profits).
74. The parties in Davis apparently raised the issue of whether the transaction was more
like a division of property or more like a sale or exchange. Hence, the Court, after deciding that
the property division analogy was inapposite, leapt to the conclusion that the transfer was like a
taxable sale or exchange. See Davis, 370 U.S. at 69-71. The Court did not consider whether the
transfer was analogous to a gift or bequest, a support payment, or a contribution to capital.
75. The recent case of Newark Morning Ledger v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993),
presented a similar choice to the Court. There the taxpayer acquired a small town newspaper
and attempted to depreciate the subscriber base. The government argued unsuccessfully that
the subscriber base was "goodwill," which is per se nondepreciable. The Court held that the
subscriber base had a finite useful life because subscribers die, move away, or allow
subscriptions to lapse. 113 S. Ct. at 1681. The better government argument would have been
that subscriber lists should be treated as nondepreciable under the "mass asset" convention
precisely because any costs of replacing expired customers are currently deductible under a tax
accounting convention based on administrative convenience, although such replacement costs
are actually capital expenditures that should not be deducted currently in theory. In other
words, should the Court have sanctioned two accounting conventions, both based on
administrative convenience, each of which is wrong in isolation but which combined produce an
approximately correct overall result?
76. In Dodge, The Logic of Tax at 118-19 (cited in note 7), I argue that the disparate tax
treatment of "alimony" and "child support," see I.R.C. § 71(a), (c), is not justified, because in
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to tax the husband to whom the wealth accrued as opposed to having
the gain completely escape tax. Implicitly, Davis is a precedent for a
deemed-realization rule for gratuitous transfers. Otherwise, Davis
has little precedential value or relevance. 77 In fact, it was overturned
by Congress in favor of a carryover basis rule on its very facts.78 That
rule is now the subject of intense controversy.79
III. TECHNICAL FEATURES
This section sets forth various suggestions on how to imple-
ment a deemed-realization rule. Most of these suggestions fill in gaps
left in Professor Zelenak's proposal or manifest points of
disagreement with him.
A. General Considerations
Treating a gratuitous transfer as a realization event under the
income tax should not be viewed, conceptually at least, as a substitute
for an estate tax or other death tax. An income tax is wholly separate
from a transfer tax, which is explicitly a tax on "capital," i.e., previ-
ously taxed income. A very wealthy person will avoid income tax, but
not estate tax, by reason of death where the aggregate basis exceeds
the aggregate value. The income tax has only to do with the annual
economic attributes of individual taxpayers, nothing to do with
generations, and little to do with families. In general, then, there is
no a priori reason to import estate and gift tax concepts into the
deemed-realization rules. At the same time, it must be considered
that the burden of the deemed-realization tax, especially the one
imposed by reason of death, will be borne ultimately by the decedent's
both cases the recipient (usually the wife) has a cash accession to wealth with no obligation to
account for the funds.
77. Davis should be relegated to the note material of casebooks. It is hard to see that it
has any precedential value whatsoever, and on its own facts it has been superseded by statute.
See I.R.C. § 1041 (stating that no gain or loss results on transfer of property to former spouse if
the transfer is incident to divorce). As suggested in the text, the government's concessions
probably constrained the holding, but analyzing the propriety of such concessions leads the class
far astray from the realization topic.
78. I.R.C. § 1041.
79. See, for example, C. Garrison Lepow, Tax Policy for Lovers and Cynics: How Divorce
Settlement Became the Last Tax Shelter in America, 62 Notre Dame L. Rev. 32, 60 (1986)
(concluding that Section 1041 fails to address an "essential problem of unfairness" in tax
treatment of property transferred in a property settlement); Michael Asimow, The Assault on
Tax-Free Divorce: Carryover Basis and Assignment of Income, 44 Tax L. Rev. 65, 66 (1988)
(arguing for the superiority of the carryover basis principle of Section 1041).
1844 [Vol. 47:1827
1994] TAXING GAINS 1845
successors. Also, the deemed-realization tax must be designed so that
it is capable of efficient administration.
B. Life Insurance
Under present law, life insurance is tax favored in three ways:
(1) the proceeds are generally excludable by the recipient under
Section 101(a); (2) the "inside build-up" is not subject to tax as it is
earned;8 and (3) withdrawals are treated as coming first out of basis
and last out of accrued but untaxed income.81 Professor Zelenak's
proposal only implicates directly the first: The Section 101(a)
exclusion is the equivalent of giving the recipient of the proceeds a
stepped-up basis. If life insurance is to be treated consistently with
other assets, the gain should be subject to tax at the insured's death.
Such gain should be taxed to the person who owned the policy
immediately before the insured's death.
The problem here is how to compute the gain. A pure term life
or accident insurance policy is nothing but a betting pool. Each pre-
mium payment is a wager that expires at the end of the policy year,
and, hence, is conceptually an "expense" rather than a capital
expenditure creating basis. It might be argued that the proceeds of
term insurance should be tax free on the ground that all of the
premiums going into the actuarial pool were nondeductible; thus, the
winnings already have been taxed elsewhere in the system.82 Under
this view, Section 101(a) with regards to term insurance has a similar
rationale to that of Section 102. However, Section 102 prohibits
double tax of the same thing when the transfer involves related
parties; the participants in the actuarial pool, in contrast, are total
80. Arguably, the inside build-up, i.e., the earnings on the savings component, should be
taxed as it accrues even to cash method taxpayers by analogy to the original issue discount
rules, see I.R.C. § 1272, or to the constructive receipt doctrine, see Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a). But
see Griffith v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 882 (1961) (reviewed) (holding that constructive receipt
doctrine does not actually require inclusion of inside build-up). The neutrality norm dictates
that similar investments should be taxed alike, preferably as the income accrues. See text
accompanying note 48.
81. See I.R.C. § 72(e)(5)(A), (C).
82. Another version of the same argument is that actuarial pools (and betting pools) do
not involve the creation of new wealth and, therefore, should not be taxed. See Lane, 3 Am. J.
Tax Policy at 31-32 (cited in note 25). Another argument for excluding life insurance proceeds is
that they compensate the beneficiaries for loss. See Goode, The Individual Income Tax at 126
(cited in note 28). If the loss referred to is the economic loss of support, only in some cases does
a life insurance beneficiary incur the loss. The tax system generally ignores losses of human
capital, see Joseph M. Dodge, Taxes and Torts, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 143, 152-53 (1992) (analyzing
a similar argument in the context of Section 104), and in any case it cannot be said that the lost
human capital was ever owned by the life insurance beneficiary. If life insurance merely makes
up for a lost bequest, then Section 101(a) stands on the same footing as Section 102.
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strangers. In that context, the tax treatment of the premium payors
should not dictate the tax treatment of the winners who do have a
clear accession to wealth. Lottery winners and gamblers cannot avoid
tax by showing that the losers could not deduct their bets. Also,
personal casualty insurance recoveries in excess of basis are included
in gross income notwithstanding the nondeductibility of the
premiums.83 Moreover, it is possible that disallowing any deduction to
the premium payers is wrong; they can be said to have incurred short-
term investment losses.8 The reason Section 102 taxes the transferor
rather than the transferee, i.e., to protect the integrity of progressive
rate structure, is not applicable where strangers are involved. Thus,
the excess of the proceeds over the current year's premium is gain
that should be taxed to the policy owner.
A conventional ordinary life insurance policy has a savings
component (reserve values) in addition to the actuarial pool
component (term insurance). In theory, the owner's policy basis
should be determined by only the premiums allocable to the savings
component from year to year. In practice, however, it is hard to
separate out the two components. The policy reserve typically will
support term insurance coverage for a period even after premiums
cease. 15 Retroactively allocating premiums between the savings
component and the actuarial pool component may be too difficult.
Treating all premiums as capital expenditures under a
deemed-realization rule is a rough solution. Such a rule favors
ordinary life insurance by overstating basis. But it is less favorable
than allowing current deductions for pure insurance premiums. And
it is easy to administer.
83. Compare with I.R.C. § 165(h) (stating that personal casualty gains should be netted
against personal casualty losses). The gain may be deferred under Section 1033 if certain
conditions are met.
84. It might be argued that allowing a deduction for term insurance premiums would sug-
gest allowing deductions for personal casualty insurance premiums. See generally Louis
Kaplow, The Income Tax as Insurance: The Casualty Loss and Medical Expense Deductions and
the Exclusion of Medical Insurance Premiums, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 1485 (1991). However, the two
situations are distinguishable. The loss that life insurance protects against is the loss of human
capital by reason of death. Human capital, however, has no basis. Because human capital is
ignored for tax purposes, see generally Joseph M. Dodge, 54 Ohio St. Law J. 927 (cited in note
51), life insurance transactions are self-contained investments. Personal casualty insurance, on
the other hand, relates to losses on assets that possess tax attributes, including basis. Thus, a
casualty insurance recovery is offset against the basis of the lost or destroyed property,
producing gain or loss or reducing basis. The premiums are analogous to nondeductible repairs
on personal consumption property. Treating them as capital expenditures would be impractical
(except for car and home insurance), because the policy likely covers several assets. Premiums
on life insurance, in contrast, are not analogous to repairs; they are simply bets.
85. See D. M. McGill, Life Insurance 315-25 (R. D. Irwin, 1967).
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C. Employee Death Benefits, Annuities, IRAs, and IRD Items
Under current law, employee death benefits, annuities, and
Individual Retirement Accounts ("IRAs") are categorized as income in
respect of a decedent ("IRD") and do not receive a value at death basis
under Section 1014.86 Instead, the decedent's basis carries over to the
beneficiary, who is taxed as payments are received 87 with basis offsets
(if any) calculated under the Section 72 annuity rules.88 Professor
Zelenak favors retention of existing law in this area (which is essen-
tially a carryover basis approach) in lieu of a deemed-realization rule.
I agree with this conclusion as far as employee death benefits
(and other deferred compensation) are concerned, but mainly on the
ground that these items (as well as most other IRD items) have a zero
or low basis, 9 so that the beneficiary would usually be taxed on the
full amounts received. Thus, the issue here is essentially that of the
simple attribution of income from services. Unlike conventional
investments under a carryover basis rule, here there would be no
basis allocation problem. Given a system where employees are not
taxed on compensation and related benefits as they accrue, it is better
to attribute this income to the beneficiary, who receives the payments
by reason of death, rather than the employee who is dead and who
never enjoyed the income. A carryover basis rule for employee death
benefits would continue to treat such benefits as income from human
capital, as opposed to income from investments.90
86. I.R.C. § 1014(c).
87. I.R.C. § 691(a), (d).
88. See I.R.C. § 72(b) (excluding from gross income certain payments received as an
annuity); I.R.C. § 402(a) (applying Section 72 annuity rules to qualified plans); I.R.C. § 402(b)
(applying Section 72 annuity rules to nonqualified plans); I.R.C. § 408(d)(1) (applying Section 72
annuity rules to IRA distributions).
89. The decedent would have a zero or low basis in the case of qualified plans and IRAs
because contributions to such plans generally are deductible or excludable. Unfunded non-
qualified plans have a zero basis because nothing has been included in income. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.83-3(e); Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 174, modified by Rev. Rul. 70-435, 1970-2 Cum.
Bull. 100. Funded nonqualified plans would have a significant basis if they were included
earlier in the employee's gross income under Section 83(a) on account of such rights being
vested, but this situation is relatively rare. See, for example, Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8113107
(concluding that funded nonqualified plan is not included under Section 83 where creditors of
employer can reach the plan).
90. Income from human capital is taxed as received in the form of wages or deferred
compensation, with no basis recovery with respect to human capital acquisition costs such as
education. Investments are made with after tax dollars: the nondeductible capital expenditures
produce a basis that is recovered through depreciation and loss deductions. If rights to em-
ployee death benefits and deferred compensation were taxed at death, they would henceforth be
taxed as investments. See generally Mary L. Heen, An Alternative Approach to the Taxation of
Employment Discrimination Recoveries Under Federal Civil Rights Statutes: Income From
Human Capital, Realization and Nonrecognition, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 549 (1994).
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Commercial annuities, which have a substantial basis, should
be subject to the deemed-realization rule; they are easy to value and
are otherwise indistinguishable from life insurance.
The IRD items that have a zero basis should be treated in the
same manner as employee death benefits,91 whereas IRD items with a
substantial basis (such as installment obligations) should be subject
to the deemed-realization rule.
D. Inter Vivos Trusts
In the case of inter vivos trusts, the deemed-realization rule
should be keyed to the grantor trust rules92 rather than the estate and
gift tax rules on completed transfers. 93 Thus, a transfer to a trust the
income (or gains) of which, to any extent, would be taxed to the gran-
tor should not be a deemed-realization event. In such case, the
deemed-realization event would be the earlier of death or loss of
"grantor trust" status. A transfer to a nongrantor trust would be a
deemed-realization event.
E. Co-ownership Property
One of the more outrageous features of present law is that the
surviving spouse's share of community property, as well as the dece-
dent's share, receives a Section 1014 basis.9 4 Otherwise, the benefits
of Section 1014 accrue to only that fraction of the property included in
the gross estate of the decedent.
95
Under the deemed-realization rule, however, gain or loss
would be recognized only with respect to the undivided fractional
interest owned by the decedent.
In the case of survivorship property, where ownership is not
subject to undivided interests, the two alternatives are: (1) to treat
the property as if it were tenancy in common property; or (2) to treat
the entire property as being owned by each decedent in turn. The
91. Individual Retirement Accounts are like do-it-yourself deferred compensation plans;
the annual IRA deduction (which cannot create any basis) for contributions to an IRA cannot
exceed the lesser of $2,000 or compensation income. I.R.C. § 219(b). Nondeductible
contributions can be made to an IRA under I.R.C. § 408(o); such contributions create basis.
92. I.R.C. §§ 671-677.
93. I.R.C. 88 2036-2038, 2511-2512.
94. See I.R.C. § 1014(b)(6). This rule is based on the assumption that husbands earn
100% of the wealth and die before their wives; in a separate property jurisdiction, wives would
obtain a Section 1014 basis for all of the marital assets only in cases where these assumptions
hold true.
95. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-2(b)(2).
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first alternative would present a tempting opportunity for partially
deferring the deemed-realization tax. However, Congress might pre-
fer to sanction such deferral in cases where the joint tenants are hus-
band and wife.96 Otherwise, the second alternative should prevail.
97
F. Successive Interests
It would appear that the deemed-realization tax can be avoided
after the initial taxable transfer into trust upon the death of succes-
sive trust beneficiaries. However, unlike Professor Zelenak,98 I do not
view this as being a problem, because the income tax-including any
of its deemed-realization aspects-is not based on the idea of genera-
tions. For better or worse, the trust is a taxable entity separate from
the beneficiaries. Moreover, unlike present law,99 unrealized gain in
trusts would not be able to avoid tax permanently. If tax deferral
through trusts is considered a significant problem, there is no reason
why any deemed taxable event must be keyed to the death of a
beneficiary or the passing of generations of beneficiaries. In other
words, the taxable event could be deemed to be the last day of the
year in which, say, the tenth, twentieth, etc., anniversary of the birth
of the trust occurred.
Should trust distributions in-kind be treated as deemed-reali-
zation events?'00 Such a rule would be preferable to a carryover basis
rule, because the latter would allow the trustee, if authorized by the
will or state law, to target high basis assets to high income beneficiar-
ies, and so on, and possibly create problems under fiduciary law by
reason of favoring some beneficiaries over others. A deemed-realiza-
tion rule simply would treat the distribution as a sale followed by a
distribution at fair market value; the burden of the taxes payable by
the trust would be felt pro rata by all remaining beneficiaries.
96. Compare with I.R.C. § 2040(b) (stating that first spouse to die is deemed to own half
for estate tax and Section 1014 purposes).
97. Compare with I.R.C. § 2040(a) (providing rebuttable presumption that the first dece-
dent is the "transferor" of the entire property where joint tenants are not husband and wife).
98. See Zelenak, 46 Vand. L. Rev. at 410-13 (cited in note 1).
99. Under present law, assets in trust obtain a Section 1014 basis in any case where any
person includes the trust in a gross estate, probably by way of a general power of appointment,
see I.R.C. § 2041(a)(2), whether or not any estate tax is due. Trust assets also obtain a Section
1014 basis to the extent that the trust is subject to the generation-skipping tax by reason of a
taxable termination type of generation-skipping transfer. See I.R.C. § 2654(a)(2).
100. Current law treats a trust or estate distribution as a nontaxable event with carryover
basis, but allows the trustee or estate representative to elect to realize gain or loss. See I.R.C. §
643(e).
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An estate distribution could be treated according to the exist-
ing rules,101 except where the estate resembles a trust, i.e., continues
past five years or so.
In a nontrust situation where a legal life estate or term inter-
est is followed by a remainder, there is no separation of legal and
equitable ownership. In this situation, the holder of the life estate or
term interest, who received the benefit of any depreciation and deple-
tion deductions, 10 2 should be treated as the owner of the property and
be subject to the deemed-realization rule upon expiration of the inter-
est.
G. Transfer Tax Deduction for Income Taxes
I agree with Professor Zelenak that the income tax paid or due
should reduce the tax bases under the gift, estate, and generation-
skipping taxes, just as would taxes paid on predeath realizations.
H. Burden of the Tax
In the case of gifts, deemed-realization tax would be paid by
the donor. In the case of death, the tax would be paid by the
decedent's estate to the economic detriment of the decedent's succes-
sors. The main issue here is whether the tax should be borne by the
decedent's successors: (1) in proportion to the gain allocable to the
assets received by each; (2) in proportion to the value of the property
received by each; (3) by the residue (or intestate takers); or (4) accord-
ing to the decedent's will (or in default thereof under state law). If
the gains had been realized before death, the taxes would have been
borne by the residuary takers (or heirs) in accordance with alternative
(3). However, a federal rule so mandating would create an additional
but unnecessary layer of probate law. Alternative (4) is the simplest
solution, and in many cases would produce the same results as alter-
native (3). However, states would have to decide whether to treat
deemed-realization taxes as "death taxes" or "estate debts," since the
allocation rules may differ between the two.
10 3
101. See note 100.
102. See I.R.C. §§ 167(d), 611(b) (stating that life tenants receive the benefit of any
depreciation and depletion deductions).
103. Estate debts typically are charged first against residuary assets (or if there is no re-
siduary clause, against assets passing by intestacy). See William M. McGovern, Jr., Sheldon F.
Kurtz, and Jan Ellen Rein, Wills, Trusts, and Estates § 10.2 at 407 (West, 1988). Death taxes
may be charged in the same fashion, but the trend appears to be to charge them against all
estate transfers on a pro rata basis. See id. § 10.3 at 412-13.
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L Character
The main purpose of the tax preference for long-term capital
gains is to mitigate the lock-in effect produced by the realization prin-
ciple and Section 1014. These rationales dissolve under a deemed-
realization rule. Death is the ultimate involuntary event; at this
point tax incentives can have no effect. Therefore, gains deemed
realized at death should be capital only to the extent of current capi-
tal losses plus unused capital loss carryovers, and the rest should be
treated as ordinary gains.
Gains deemed realized through inter vivos gifts arguably
might be treated as capital since they are associated with a voluntary
event. Although this rule would create some incentive to make gifts
of appreciated property prior to death, the taxpayer always could have
sold the property prior to death (and perhaps have given the gross
proceeds to a donee). In any event, gains deemed realized within
three years of death could be treated as having the same character as
such gains deemed realized at death. The best solution is to eliminate
the capital gains preference entirely.
Currently, capital losses for a year (including carryovers to the
year) can be deducted only to the extent of capital gains for the year
plus three thousand dollars, with any excess being carried forward. 04
This rule prevents the taxpayer from selectively realizing losses to
produce the tax base while failing to realize gain from appreciated
assets. This rationale would continue to apply in the case of deemed-
realization gifts but not to losses deemed realized at death, which
should be ordinary.
J. Excess Losses
Under current law, unused capital losses (and business net
operating losses) disappear at death and do not pass to the decedent's
estate or successors. Perhaps such losses could have been used in
whole or in part if the decedent had realized all available capital
gains prior to death. In contrast, unused capital losses (and net oper-
ating losses) of an estate pass to the estate's distributees. 10 5 The issue
under a deemed-realization rule is what should happen to deemed-
realization losses in excess of deemed-realization gains in the year of
death. Such excess losses should be applied first against ordinary
104. I.R.C. § 1211(a).
105. I.R.C. § 642(h).
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income in the year of death, with any remaining excess carried back
first to offset any net capital gains over the three years prior to the
year of death, and then to offset ordinary income in such years.106 Due
to the statute of limitations, it is not feasible to carry any remaining
excess losses back further than three years. However, to the extent
that the losses, if realized in earlier years, would have produced a tax
benefit in those years, the ultimate beneficiaries of such tax savings
would have been the decedent's residuary legatees (or heirs).1
0 7
Because the burden of estate income taxes ultimately is borne by the
same residuary legatees (or heirs),10 8 it is not illogical to allow unused
excess deemed-realization net losses to be carried over to the estate
and perhaps to the residuary legatees (or heirs), notwithstanding the
general principal that losses are to be deducted only by those
incurring them.0 9 The government might object on the ground that
estates are subject to the highest marginal rates (39.6 percent) after
only $7,500 of taxable income, compared to $250,000 of taxable
income for other taxpayers, but the compressed rate schedule for
estates itself makes no sense, at least for the first two or three years,
because estates are not created to avoid income tax.
As an alternative to carrying the losses over to the estate, the
decedent's final return could receive a refundable tax credit equal to
some arbitrary percentage (say, twenty percent, but no more than
twenty-eight percent) of the amount of any unused excess losses.
However, any scheme allowing tax benefits for any excess losses
remaining after all carrybacks and carryforwards are exhausted
should be designed to safeguard against the possibility that such
losses might never have produced any tax benefits to the decedent." 0
106. Professor Zelenak would follow a slightly different order of utilization. See Zelenak,
46 Vand. L. Rev. at 435 (cited in note 1).
107. Under the law of wills, the residuary legatees (or the intestate heirs if there is no
residuary bequest) receive the estate's net wealth after satisfaction of specific property and fixed
monetary bequests. See McGovern, et al., Wills, Trusts, and Estates § 10.2 at 407-08 (cited in
note 103). Thus, such persons enjoy the benefits, and bear the burden, of changes in the
decedents general net worth.
108. Income taxes can be charged in part against estate income and in part against princi-
pal. See Uniform Principal and Income Act, § 13(a)(6), (c)(4), 7B U.L.A. 145 (1985). But the
residuary legatees (or heirs) receive all of the estate income, except income on fixed property
bequests, and all principal in excess of specific property and fixed monetary bequests (and after
claims, etc.). Fixed monetary legatees receive no estate income.
109. There is precedent for economic losses accrued by one taxpayer being deducted by
another in Internal Revenue Code Section 691(b), dealing with "deductions] ... in respect of a
decedent," although that section only refers to certain expenses and not losses. I.R.C. § 691(b).
In general, it is more plausible to view the estate as being a continuation of the decedent than to
view the legatees and heirs as being continuations of the estate, as under present law.
110. It is conceivable that a taxpayer could have negative lifetime income. An example
would be where an infant inherited high value property that decreased in value and generated a
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Any unused capital loss carryforwards remaining in the decedent's
final year should be given similar treatment.
K Marital Exemption
There appears to be some consensus that the deemed-realiza-
tion rule should yield to a carryover basis rule in the case of transfers
between spouses."' I am not sure that the consensus is justified.
There is also a certain irony in opponents of the taxation of gains at
death taking this tack, since the same spousal unity argument would
seem to compel a carryover basis exception even under the current
stepped-up basis regime.112
It is true that transfers between spouses are not subject to gift,
estate, or generation-skipping tax.113 However, the transfer taxes are
different from the income tax, so the argument by analogy is not con-
vincing, especially insofar as the reason for not taxing interspousal
transfers is that husband and wife are viewed as being in the same
generation," 4 whereas the generational concept is irrelevant under
the income tax.
Within the income tax, husband and wife can be treated plau-
sibly as a single taxable unit only so long as both are alive. Actually,
the joint return system does not treat them as a single unit as much
as it treats them as separate taxpayers each owning half of the aggre-
gate taxable income. Nevertheless, the income splitting function of
loss before the infant acquired any income of her own. Here the negative taxable income would
not have produced any refund. To avoid the possibility that losses could generate an unjustified
refund, the refund could be limited to a maximum of the number of years the decedent lived
past the age of 25 (the assumption being that the taxpayer would have minimal income of her
own before that age) multiplied by 50% of the average taxable income (disregarding loss
carrybacks) for the decedent's 3 years prior to the year of death (as a proxy of assumed average
lifetime tax rate).
111. See Zelenak, 46 Vand. L. Rev. at 395 (cited in note 1); Kurtz and Surrey, 70 Colum. L.
Rev. at 1385 (cited in note 1) (referring to 1969 Treasury Department tax reform proposal).
112. See Harry L. Gutman, Reforming Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes after ERTA, 69 Va.
L. Rev. 1183, 1235-36 (1983).
113. See I.R.C. § 2056 (regarding an estate tax marital deduction); I.R.C. § 2523 (regarding
a gift tax marital deduction); I.R.C. § 2651(c)(1) (providing that spouse of transferor is a nonskip
person).
114. The transfer tax system as a whole can be viewed as attempting to tax transfers from
generation to generation. See I.R.C. § 2013 (providing estate tax credit for estate tax on prior
decedent who died within ten years of current decedent); I.R.C. §§ 2056, 2523 (providing estate
and gift tax marital deduction); I.R.C. §§ 2601-2663 (imposing tax on generation-skipping
transfers). As a matter of positive law, nonmarital same-generation transfers are subject to
estate and gift, but not generation-skipping, tax. Such transfers, however, are probably rela-
tively insignificant in the total wealth transfer context.
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the joint return election ceases to have any conceptual relevance at
death."1
Section 1041, enacted to overrule the Davis case, disregards
transfers between husbands and wives for tax purposes. The gov-
ernment supported enactment of Section 1041 because it was too hard
to enforce the Davis rule in the context of divorcing spouses." 6
Section 1041 has been criticized on the merits, because: (1) the tax
result to the transferee spouse depends on the fortuitous circum-
stance of the transferor's basis; and (2) the transferor should have
been taxed on gain that accrued while the transferor controlled the
property." 7 These arguments echo those favoring a preference for a
deemed-realization rule over a carryover basis rule in the case of
gratuitous transfers. In the case of interspousal death-time transfers,
enforcement would not be a problem, since the Internal Revenue
Service would be aware of the death of a decedent" 8 and could require
production of information on assets the decedent held at death.
However one views Section 1041 on the merits, there is
actually no compelling reason why it cannot be retained for inter vivos
transfers between spouses."9 It is true that a carryover basis rule for
gifts combined with a deemed-realization rule at death could induce
tax motivated gifts of low basis property. But the making of gifts
entails sufficient nontax costs and detriments such that massive
erosion of the tax would not occur. 20
If a spousal exemption at death were nevertheless adopted on
sentimental or political grounds, steps can be taken to make it easy to
administer and to reduce its tax avoidance potential. In general, the
exemption should not be linked to the artificial estate tax rules involv-
ing the marital deduction; instead, the exemption should be available
only where the item in question passes unequivocally to the surviving
spouse alone.12' This basic principle not only will insure that the
115. The word "conceptual" is used to recognize the fact that, as a matter of positive tax
law, the surviving spouse can file under the joint return rate schedule. I.R.C. §§ 1(a) and 2(a).
This privilege, however, lasts for only two years following the year of death; it does not last until
the death or remarriage of the surviving spouse. Id.
116. It is said that husbands were not reporting gain, whereas wives did not neglect to
claim a stepped-up basis. Also, there were the issues of just what transfers were subject to
Davis (divisions of community property were not) and the larger one of the lack of geographical
uniformity. See Jt. Comm. on Taxation, General Explanation of The Revenue Provisions of the
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 710-11 (1984).
117. See note 61.
118. The taxable year of the decedent ends at the moment of death. See I.R.C. § 443(a)(2).
119. See note 116.
120. See note 27 and accompanying text.
121. By far the most popular form of marital deduction transfer appears to be the qualified
terminable interest property ("QTIP') trust, which was made possible by the 1981 addition of
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exemption inures solely to the surviving spouse, but also will: (1)
reduce uncertainty as to the amount of the deemed-realization tax
(which would operate as a deduction against the estate tax base); (2)
be easy to administer; and (3) limit the ability of the estate's personal
representative to manipulate the system by selecting low basis prop-
erty to fund marital transfers.
Thus, all transfers into a marital trust should be subject to the
deemed-realization rule, because the surviving spouse will bear only
indirectly the burden of any tax borne by the trust,122 as will the other
beneficiaries, just as would be the case with a nonmarital trust of
which the surviving spouse is a beneficiary. For nontrust transfers,
the marital exemption should be allowed only for: (1) bequests of
specific property (such as tangibles, automobiles, and the personal
residence) solely to the surviving spouse; (2) residual bequests (or
inheritances) where the surviving spouse is the sole residual legatee
(or heir);123 and (3) nonprobate transfers exclusively to the surviving
spouse. Although these rules would not cover the situation where a
residual bequest or inheritance passes to one or more parties in addi-
tion to the surviving spouse, any burden of the deemed realization
rule in such a situation would be shared with the other parties.
L. Exemption for Small and Moderate Estates
Contrary to received wisdom,124 I see no persuasive justifica-
tion for any small estate exemption to the deemed-realization-at-
death rule. Certainly, to confer an income tax exemption keyed to the
six hundred thousand dollars estate and gift tax exemption makes a
I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7). See Chris J. Prestophina, Strategies Recommended by Experienced Estate
Planners, 133 Trusts & Estates 50 (Jan. 1994). The QTIP trust qualifies for the marital
deduction even though the surviving spouse (usually the wife) has only a right to income and no
right to consume or control the corpus. While under prior law the surviving spouse had the
right to control the corpus, the QTIP rules have the overall social effect of increasing the
economic control of decedent spouses relative to the surviving spouses. Compare I.R.C. §
2056(b)(5) (requiring transferee spouse to possess general power of appointment over corpus).
By providing an income tax incentive to leave property outright to the surviving spouse, the
proposed income tax rules would have the opposite effect.
122. The surviving spouse would have only the right to the income from such trust. I.R.C.
§ 2056(b)(5)-(8).
123. For example, if X bequeaths her residue to her husband and son in equal shares, the
husband and son will presumptively become co-owners of each asset in the residue. Although
the assets eventually may be partitioned or allocated between the husband and son on a nonco-
ownership basis, this result cannot be assured at the time of X's death. Even if X's will man-
dates a partition or allocation, it cannot be determined as of X's death which assets the husband
and son will receive.
124. See Galvin, 46 Vand. L. Rev. at 1529-30 (cited in note 1) (explaining his support for a
basis exemption).
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mockery of the income tax and its underlying aims and policies. No
one has ever suggested that low income taxpayers should not pay tax
on realized gains or any other discrete category of income. The
exemption idea treats the deemed-realization proposal as if it were
merely an incremental estate tax. Again, the two taxes are unrelated.
It is said that valuation in the case of small estates is not
worth the effort, especially because no valuation would be required for
estate tax purposes. This argument is disingenuous, because a valu-
ation is required even in small estates under current law to establish
a Section 1014 basis. In any event, valuation difficulties are a func-
tion of the assets involved, not the size of the estate in question.
Assets such as life insurance, employee death benefits, annuities,
liquidated claims, and most IRD items are both easy to value and
highly liquid, as are debt obligations and any asset traded on an ex-
change. (Some of these items would be subject to a carryover basis
rule.) Basis is also easy to compute in these cases, because the rele-
vant information is in the hands of third parties, such as brokers.
Hard to value items are such because of nonliquidity. Nonliquidity
raises special problems that are considered separately below. Also, a
narrowly drawn marital exemption along the lines suggested above
can be utilized so as to postpone valuation of nonliquid assets,
including such borderline items as art works and collectibles.
A small estate exemption actually would create more adminis-
trative problems than it would avoid. First, it would have to be de-
cided whether the exemption was to be applied against value, gain, or
basis. Then, the estate would be required to decide what assets, etc.,
were used up against the exemption. Antiabuse rules would have to
be designed to prevent selective manipulation of the exemption
rules.125
M. Gift Exclusions
Admittedly, it would be harder for the Internal Revenue
Service to enforce a deemed-realization rule in the case of inter vivos
gifts. However, there is no reason to create any unnecessary exemp-
tions for gifts, and the current gift tax exemption rules should not be
adopted as a model.126 First, nonmarital gifts in excess of ten thou-
125. Professor Zelenak devotes eight pages to elaborate upon these issues. Zelenak, 46
Vand. L. Rev. at 416-24.
126. I.R.C. Section 2503(b) exempts from gift tax gifts up to $10,000 per donee per year per
donor. Robert B. Smith thoroughly criticizes this provision in Should We Give Away the Annual
Exclusion?, 1 Fla. Tax Rev. 361, _ (1993). See also Jeffrey G. Sherman, 'Tis a Gift To Be
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sand dollars per donee per year must be reported on a gift tax re-
turn, 127 and a schedule could be designed to alert the donor and the
Service of any income tax gain or loss. Second, any gift of property in
registered form creates a paper trail in the hands of third parties who
could be required to file information returns.128 Third, any transfer to
a nongrantor trust creates a new taxable entity that could be required
to file an information return. The same is also true of any transfers
to charity.129 Any exemption, therefore, would be limited to relatively
small value transfers of nonregistered tangible personal property
outright and not in trust.
N. Gifts v. Support
Gifts, which would be subject to the deemed-realization rule,
are analytically distinct from support. Thus, the question arises
whether this distinction presents a problem for the deemed-realiza-
tion proposal, and the answer is "no." In-kind support, rather than
gifts, can tolerate the "shared consumption" characterization.
Basically, the provision of lodging, food, clothing, and transportation
is ignored for income tax purposes, although collateral income tax
consequences flow from the provision or receipt of support. 30 Other
categories of support, such as health care and education, typically
involve cash payments. The actual transfer of the ownership of prop-
erty can be considered support only in the case of consumption items,
such as cars, audio and video systems, boats, personal computers, and
so on, which depreciate in value after purchase. Any deemed loss on
these items would be nondeductible anyway. Transfers of appreciat-
ing tangible personal property, such as art works and collectibles,
should be treated as gifts and not support. In sum, the gifts of any
appreciated property should be per se subject to the deemed-realiza-
tion-at-gift rule.
Property transfers to or for the benefit of an ex-spouse in con-
nection with a divorce are currently nonrecognition, carryover basis,
Simple: The Need for a New Definition of 'uture Interest" for Gift Tax Purposes, 55 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 585, 664-75 (1987) (criticizing the availability of the annual gift tax exclusion).
127. I.R.C. § 6019.
128. Compare with I.R.C. §§ 6041-6050P (imposing existing information return require-
ments on nontaxpayers).
129. In general, I agree with Professor Zelenak that gifts in-kind to charity should track
the existing charitable deduction rules of I.R.C. Section 170(e). See Zelenak, 46 Vand. L. Rev. at
401-03 (cited in note 1).
130. See I.R.C. § 63(c)(5) (providing for partial loss of standard deduction for person
claimed as a dependent); I.R.C. § 151(c) (providing dependency exemptions for support provid-
ers); I.R.C. § 151(d)(2) (regarding loss by dependent of personal exemption).
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events under Section 1041. This provision does not, however, apply to
transfers to or for the benefit of minor children incident to a divorce,
which presumably are governed by the Section 1015 basis rules. The
considerations that lead me to prefer a deemed-realization approach
over a carryover basis approach apply in the divorce context as well as
in the gift context.'13  Admittedly, residents of community property
jurisdictions would be relatively unimpacted by this rule 32 but the
problem there lies in following community property law for income tax
purposes. 3 3 These matters are controversial.1 4 In any event, it would
do no great violence to the deemed-realization proposal to carve out
an exception to it for divorce-related transfers.
0. Nonliquid Assets
If transfers of nonliquid assets were to trigger gain, the trans-
feror may in certain cases be unable to come up with the cash to pay
the tax, although this concern is probably somewhat exaggerated,
because other cash or liquid assets may be available and any gift
transfer of this type can be delayed until the taxpayer achieves liquid-
ity. A collateral concern is the difficulty of valuation that often ac-
companies nonliquid assets. These problems perhaps might be
avoided by artificial rules that, for example, result in the valuation of
an interest in a closely held enterprise at its pro rata liquidation
value. 35 At the same time, it also must be acknowledged that farm
and closely held business interests probably could block enactment of
a deemed-realization proposal if their interests are threatened too
131. At the same time, I am also of the opinion that all amounts transferred in connection
with a divorce should be deducted by the transferor and included in the transferee's income.
See note 75. See also International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir.
1943), confirmed by Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6(a)-(b), holding that an employer paying an employee in-
kind receives a deduction for the full value of the property but realizes gain or loss on the
transfer.
132. See Rev. Rul. 76-83, 1976-1 Cune. Bull. 213 (recognizing gain or loss in a divorce
settlement division of community property).
133. See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 118 (1930) (holding that for income tax purposes
community property income may be split fifty-ffty between husband and wife).
134. See, for example, Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in
Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 52-65 (1980) (critiquing Poe v. Seaborn).
135. I.R.C. Sections 2701, 2703, and 2704, were added to the estate and gift tax in 1991 to
combat estate freezes and certain other devices that cause value to disappear. These provisions
did not, however, abolish discounts pertaining to minority interests, blockage, lack of market-
ability, inability to liquidate, and so on. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-3(b)(4). If the estate and gift
tax valuation rules pertaining to closely held business interests and farms were more satisfac-
tory, one might favor carrying them over to the income tax arena. However, they are not, and
the estate and gift tax rules would not apply in many instances where the income tax deemed-
realization rule would apply.
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seriously. 136 Although it is distasteful for an academic to acknowledge
political influence, especially where the underlying policy claims are
dubious, 137 it would be frivolous to float a proposal that has no chance
of success.
Accordingly-and only if necessary to enact the deemed-reali-
zation proposal-a carryover basis exception could be allowed for hard
to value nonliquid interests in closely held businesses and farms,138
but not for real estate in general, art works, collectibles, and other
items for which a market exists.
Although legal tax academics generally abhor exceptions to
general tax rules, in this case the exception would not be as undesir-
able as most tax expenditure provisions, because nonliquid interests
in closely held enterprises are typically the creation of entrepreneur-
ship and are not normally purchased in the same manner as conven-
tional (and more passive) investments. In other words, such interests
are not meaningfully substitutable with other property and invest-
ments.139 Therefore, the availability of the exception likely will not
lead to overallocation of resources to closely held enterprises, and, for
the same reason, the exception will not be overly exploited for the
136. Farm and small business interests successfully lobbied for the enactment of I.R.C.
Section 2032A, which values farm real estate at its going concern, rather than highest and best
use, value for estate tax purposes. They also obtained repeal of former I.R.C. Section 2036(c),
although they had to settle for Chapter 14 (I.R.C. §§ 2701-2704) in its stead. See also I.R.C. §§
303, 6166 (applying special rules to mitigate liquidity concerns where closely held business
interests comprise a substantial portion of the net estate). One reason for increasing the gift
and estate tax credit, I.R.C. §§ 2010, 2505, from $47,000 in 1981 to $192,800 in 1987 (a credit of
$192,800 exempts taxable transfers cumulating $600,000 from any estate or gift tax) was to
provide relief for farms, ranches, and small businesses. Similar concerns motivated the
reduction of the highest marginal rate from 70% to (what was then expected to be) 50%. See
Tax Incentive Act of 1981, H.R. Rep. No. 97-201, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 154, 156 (1981) (stating
reasons for increasing the gift and estate tax credit). For a commentary on the politics of the
1981 estate and gift tax changes, see Michael Kinsley, High on the Hog, III: Triumph of the
Will, New Republic 17-21 (Aug. 22 and 29, 1981). See also Willard H. Pedrick, Oh, To Die Down
Under! Abolition of Death and Gift Duties in Australia, 35 Tax Law. 113, 114-17 (1981)
(discussing the death duty abolition movement in Australia).
137. The interest of farm and small business owners vis-A-vis death taxes is to be able to
convey their interests to their successors (children) intact. However, there is no reason to
believe that family members are better managers of business property than willing buyers in
the market. Death taxes might force such assets onto the market where they will be subject to
highest and best use. See generally Ronald Hjorth, Special Estate Tax Valuation of Farmland
and the Emergence of a Landholding Elite Class, 53 Wash. L. Rev. 609 (1978).
138. Such an interest would be one that either is not traded on an exchange or over the
counter, or is subject to restrictions that render the interest nonmarketable in ordinary
commerce. Closely held investment entities would be subject to a look-through rule.
139. It would be folly for a family outsider to purchase a minority equity interest in a
closely held enterprise, since the outsider would be at the mercy of the controlling interests,
except perhaps in the case of a general partnership interest.
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sake of tax avoidance.14 Also, because the number of carryover basis
assets in any given estate will be few-perhaps only one-any basis
allocation problems will be minimal.
P. The Decedent's Personal Residence
If the personal residence passes exclusively to the surviving
spouse, it would qualify for the narrow marital carryover basis excep-
tion discussed earlier. Farm residences would fall within a separate
carryover basis exception. Otherwise, there is no persuasive policy
reason to carve out an exemption to personal residences as such.
Q. Transition
I basically agree with Professor Zelenak's discussion of the
transition problem.141 I too would oppose any grandfathering, but if
any transitional relief is provided, it should not be so complex that it
provides an excuse for repeal. 4 2
IV. CONCLUSION
I strongly agree with Professor Zelenak's basic position that
death and gift generally should be treated as deemed-realization
events, although my reasons for doing so may differ, or supplement,
his. At the design level, I oppose importing estate and gift tax fea-
tures into the deemed-realization income tax system. In particular, I
oppose any small estate exemption, and any marital exemption should
be drawn as narrowly as possible so as to benefit exclusively the sur-
viving spouse and not be a vehicle for tax avoidance. Proposals are
made for accommodating various nonprobate dispositions to the
deemed-realization rule. On the other side, I would allow a carryover
140. On estate tax returns filed in 1990, aggregate gross estates totalled $87.1 billion. Of
this total, closely held stock totalled $7.1 billion, limited partnership interests totalled $0.8
billion, and farm assets totalled $0.2 billion. (It is not clear what is meant by "closely held
stock.") Noncorporate business interests, presumably including general partnership interests,
totalled $2.5 billion. Internal Revenue Service, U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Vol. 11, No. 3, Statistics
of Income Bulletin 67-68 (Vol. 11, No. 3, Winter 1991-92). Thus, it appears that carryover basis
assets would account for about 10% of total assets.
141. See Zelenak, 46 Vand. L. Rev. at 375-95 (cited in note 1) (discussing options for tran-
sition relief).
142. One of the reasons Congress repealed carryover basis, see note 6, was the complexity
of grandfather rules and various basis adjustments. See, for example, Richard B. Covey and
Dan T. Hastings, Cleaning Up Carryover Basis, 31 Tax Law. 615, 621-22, 641-57 (1978).
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basis rule for deferred income from the decedent's human capital.
Also, I propose a very liberal scheme for allowing deductions for ex-
cess losses, and also am willing to carve out a narrow carryover basis
exception for hard to value nonliquid assets connected with the dece-
dent's (and successor's) livelihood. Whether my (or any other)
proposal for abolishing tax-free stepped-up basis at death is politically
feasible will have to await future events.

